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me Humcm
By Sri Ramamoorti and William Olsen

Eighty percent of respondents to a
National Association of Corporate
Directors (NACD) survey of public
company audit committees felt that
failure resulting from poor risk management couldn't happen to them.
However, 50 percent thought it could
happen to other companies.
This feeling of relative "invincibility" is similar to the statistically
impossible "Lake Wobegon" effect —
where "all the women are strong, all
the men are good-looking and all the
children are above average." Could
this Lake Wobegon effect — which
results from the human tendency to
overestimate one's achievements and
capabilities in relation to others —
extend to an organization's assessment of its vulnerability to fraud risk?
Fraud is a human endeavor,
involving deception, purposeful
intent, intensity of desire, risk of
apprehension, violation of trust,
rationalization, etc. So, it is important
to understand the psychological factors that might influence the behavior of fraud perpetrators. The rationale for drawing on behavioral science
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insights is evident from the intuition
that one needs to "think like a crook
to catch a crook."
Many business professionals,
especially those in the finance arena,
tend to discount behavioral explanations. But as the incidence of fraud
continues to grow, placing the spotlight on behavioral factors may be an
important approach to not only
fraud detection, but to deterrence as
well.
The 2006 Report to the Nation
issued by the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) noted that
U.S. organizations lose almost 5 percent of their revenue to fraud, and
that the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP)-based annual fraud estimate
for the U.S. was a whopping $652 billion. In light of such sobering statistics, it behooves each and every
organization to understand the root
causes of fraud and proactively manage fraud risk.

Many discount
behavioral explanations
for fraud, but as the
incidence of fraud
continues to grow,
placing the spotlight on
behavioral factors may
be an important approach not
only to detection, but
to deterrence as well.

Why FOCU5 on Fraud Risk?
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Among the catastrophic risks afflicting orgaruzations of all sizes is the
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Behaviorally Oriented
Solutions for Fraud Risk Factors
Among behavioral approaches and solutions to
the fraud risk factors are:
• Sound tone at the top, with management "walking the talk";
• Align incentive structures within the organization
in a way that does not encourage fraud perpetration;
• An active board and audit committee overseeing
management performance and activities (as well
as the work by external and internal auditors);
• Nurture a culture of integrity and ethics, supported by an organizational code of conduct;
• Periodic ethics audits and enforcement of noted
violations of the code;
• Maintain an ethics and/or whistleblower hotline;
• Explicitly reward good behavior;
• Routine background checks for new and experienced hires, as well as for making senior leadership appointments (human resources needs to lead
this effort);
• Swift, decisive action to respond to incidents of
fraud so that employees and others are aware of
the organization's serious commitment to dealing
with fraud issues head-on;
• Fraud awareness training, perhaps delivered by
internal audit professionals or outside consultants,
including description of ethics hotlines and guidance on what to do when fraud is encountered;
and
• Control self-assessments that consist of process risk
owners performing risk and control mapping (and
including fraud risk considerations in such exercises).

risk of financial fraud. A single allegation of material fraud has such
devastating financial consequences,
including irreparable reputational
damage, that few companies survive
such a crisis unscathed. Fraud tends
to be frequently a hidden risk, particularly because its perpetrators take
extreme care to conceal their activities; hence, it also remains an unmanaged risk in organizations.
Nevertheless, it is rare that any
company deliberately sets out to perpetrate a massive fraud. Instead,
fraud is the unfortunate consequence
of a multitude of mostly behavioral
factors that drives otherwise honest
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people to do dishonest
things. The sociology
iind criminology literature describes fraud perpetrators as "trust violators," In other words,
trust violators are people
you wouldn't normally
suspect of committing
fraud.
Behavioral Root
Causes of Fraud

Much has been written
about the root causes of
fraud and the "fraud triangle," with its three
vertices of opportunity,
pressure/incentive and
rationalization, as referred to in the ACFE
2005 Fraud Examiner's
Manual.
What often goes
unrecognized is that all
three elements of the
fraud triangle are fundamentally behavioral constructs. Personal incentives and perceived pressure drive human
behavior, and the need
to rationalize wrongdoing as being somehow
defensible is very much
psychologically rooted.

To some extent, even
the assessment of the
opportunity to commit
fraud — including the
likelihood of being caught — is a
subjective, behavioral assessment.
Accordingly, to understand the root
causes of fraud, psychological
answers and explanations rather
than logical ones should be sought.
The decision to deviate from the
norm and commit fraud is not taken
lightly; it involves "rationalization," or
the ability to justify one's own questionable actions to oneself and others.
A tragic example is Enron Corp.'s Cliff
Baxter, who couldn't come to terms
psychologically with what had happened, and took the extraordinary
step of corrmiitting suicide.
While corporate governance

reform legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 can help
limit the opportunity for fraud, succumbing to perceived pressure and
the ability to rationalize fraudulent
acts are outside the scope of law. As
such, fraud deterrence and detection
should focus on how to deal with the
underlying behavioral dynamics —
the psychology of fraud perpetrators,
as well as the psychology of those
responsible for governance, including auditors.
Psychology of Fraud Perpetrators

An understanding of what motivates
the fraudster, whether acting alone or
in collusion with others within or
outside an organization, can go a
long way in identifying behavioral
risk factors that may indicate fraud.
A simple means-motives-opportunity
analysis would show that motives
are the crux of the matter, because
fraud requires the establishment of
intent to deceive another.
So, it is crucial to know what it is
that a fraud perpetrator desires:
money (bonus, stock-based compensation), status ("keeping up with the
Joneses," fame or celebrity status),
revenge, a catch-me-if-you-can game,
parity with others (everybody else is
doing it, why can't I?), etc.
If opportunities do not exist, the
motivated fraud perpetrator can create them by a careful analysis of
weaknesses in controls or by exploiting a generally lax environment.
However, once fraud perpetrators
take the initial steps, they frequently
find themselves unable to turn back
and escape the ruinous consequences.
Organizations must communicate
to employees acceptable standards of
behavior through a well-crafted code
of conduct that is endorsed by leadership and enforced when necessary.
Organizations should also develop a
track record of acting swiftly and
decisively whenever wrongdoing
comes to light.
And, in every case, organizations
must go to extreme lengths to protect
a whistlebiower's identity and safety
(from retaliation). Otherwise, potential fraud perpetrators are likely to
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exploit the inertia or complacency in
addressing fraud risk adequately. As
ACFE founder Joe Wells counsels,
"Let them know you're watching."
Understanding Financial
Statement Fraud

Thus, erstwhile honest and wellmeaning executives who have earned
the trust of others are often the ones
who end up perpetrating fraud.
Fraud does not start with dishonesty;
it starts with pressure: Pressure to
achieve aggressive financial performance goafs, or meet analyst expectations, frequently leads those who are
expected to make the numbers to
simply "make up" the numbers. Like
many other organizational risks,
fraud usually starts small before it
snowballs, becomes widespread,
rampant and material. Not surprisingly, the gray areas of accounting
ripe for abuse are those that are complex, ambiguous and subjective.
Complexity can help mask fraud.
Among reasons managers cook
the books are;
1. to meet analyst expectations
and forecasts about earnings;
2. to smooth earnings and income
to reduce volatility (to mask financial
distress and negative cash flows);
3. to benefit from compensation or
bonuses tied to earnings or to stay
within debt covenants imposed by
lenders; and
4. to avoid sanctions by deliberately deflating current earnings or to
win subsidies or import relief as a
protectionist advantage.
In such contexts, the award of
executive stock options provides further incentives to manipulate earnings, including enlisting the support
and cooperation of junior, economically dependent and vulnerable staff
and employees.
In all circumstances, tone from the
top is critical, and there is no excuse
for senior executives or other
employees to be active participants in
a corrupt organizational culture.
Approaches to Deterring and
Mitigating Financial Fraud Risk

From an organizational perspective.
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the goal is to create an environment
that endorses a "good ethics is good
business" philosophy, encourages
doing the right thing at every turn
and makes perpetrating fraud an
unattractive option to most people in
the organization.
It is true that economics and ethics
do not mix very well — there are
numerous examples of how incentives have trumped personal ethics
and values. Nevertheless, cultural
assimilation into a system of high
integrity and values represents a
form of programming of the human
mind that cannot be easily compromised. A culture of ethics has significant potential in reducing integrity
risks. Rewarding people for doing
the right thing sends the right signal
to others in the organization, while
shooting the messenger in the case of
a whistleblower allegation sends the
wrong signal.
To discharge their monitoring and
oversight function effectively, audit
committees need a primer on the psychology of the fraud perpetrator(s), as
well as insight about their own and
the auditors' cognitive weaknesses.
The audit committee, with assistance from the internal and external
auditors, as well as other risk management specialists and the board, is
responsible for monitoring the
behavior of management, especially
with respect to financial reporting.
However, in the current corporate
governance climate, this mandate
sometimes extends beyond financial
reporting matters.
One important behavioral insight
is recognizing that high-level fraud is
frequently a team sport that often
involves collusion. Internal control
systems that presume proper segregation of duties are not effective against
collusion and management override
of controls. In fact, a COSO Fraud
Study published in 1999 found that in
83 percent of the frauds examined,
the CEO and the CFO had colluded.
Still another problematic area is
the well-known "groupthink" bias at
the board level. Groupthink discounts
contrarian opinions or tends to sway
the group into making a "feel good"

decision. When there is an active tendency to ignore bad news due to
either indifference or sheer laziness,
board members may miss important
signals of potential fraud.
External and internal auditors
need to learn that "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."
Just because no red flags or fraud
indicia are observed does not mean
that fraud does not exist. The trusted
relationships that subsist between
external auditors and their clients
sometimes make auditors let their
guard down.
When encountering fraud scenarios, human tendencies such as the
confirmation bias (seeking confirmation of one's beliefs) and selective
perception (seeing only what one
wants to see) limit auditors' ability to
exercise an appropriate level of professional skepticism.
Interestingly, the significance of
behavioral science insights increases
even more when we move into the
domain of fraud investigahon. But that
is clearly the subject of another article.
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TAKEAWAYS
» Fraud is a human endeavor that
involves deception, purposeful intent,
intensity of desire, risk of apprehension,
violation of trust, rationalization, etc.
» The Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners found that U.S. organizations
lose almost 5 percent of their revenue to
fraud and that the GDP-based annual
fraud estimate for the U.S. was $652 billion in 2006.
» An understanding of what motivates
fraudsters can go a long way in identifying behaviorial risk factors.
» Organizations need to create environments that endorse ethics and doing the
right thing at every turn, making perpetrating fraud an unattractive option.
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